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Measuring Skilled Emigration Rates: The Case of Small States
*
 
Recent changes in information and communication technologies (ICT) have contributed to a 
dramatic increase in the integration and interdependence of countries, markets and people. 
This paper focuses on an increasingly important aspect of globalization, the international 
movement of people, with emphasis on the mobility of skilled people. This issue is of great 
concern for the many small states that experience huge brain drain levels. 
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The 1960s and 1970s saw great interest in international migration issues. Interest in the topic 
abated in the following years. However, with growth in migration
1 and remittance flows 
accelerating in recent years, interest has reappeared by source and host country analysts and 
policy makers, as well as in academia and multilateral, regional and bilateral development 
institutions (Ozden and Schiff 2006).  
The main question addressed in this paper is the relationship between skilled migration rates 
and country size. This section presents some stylized facts about the relationship between 
country size and various aspects of openness (imports, exports, trade, FDI and brain drain), 
examines various explanations for that relationship as well as a number of issues that are 
specific to the brain drain.  
First, the degree of openness of a country tends to be negatively related to its population size. 
Simple bivariate regressions show that the semi-elasticity of import/GDP to population size is 
7.15, of export/GDP is 3.72, of trade/GDP is 5.43 (simple average), of FDI/GDP is 0.64 and 
of the brain drain is 5.26. A similar value is obtained for the general emigration rate. These 
figures indicate that the brain drain is highly sensitive to country size. Its semi-elasticity is 
greater than that of exports and FDI, smaller than that of imports, and about the same as that 
of overall trade.  
Second, there are various reasons for the negative relation between skilled migration rates and 
country size, with small countries showing higher rates, particularly the developing ones:  
•  Production in small states tends to be highly specialized in a limited number of 
sectors. Hence, consumers and producers are, respectively, much more dependent on 
trade for desired consumer goods and intermediate inputs. Thus, demand for a variety 
of skills is very limited; 
•  The demand for skilled jobs in small developing countries is likely to be even more 
limited because of these countries’ specialization in the production of commodities 
(e.g., sugar) which are typically less skill intensive;  
•  Small countries also tend to be more unstable economically. The high degree of 
specialization implies a greater vulnerability to fluctuations of the world economy. 
Second, the fact that production in many of the poorer small developing economies 
                                                           
1 For instance, South-North migration has increased by 30% from 1990 to 2000 while that of skilled labor has 
increased by 70%. 
  1tends to be concentrated in commodities makes them even more vulnerable to external 
economic shocks (because of low demand elasticity and thus high fluctuations in 
price) as well as to weather shocks.  
Third, the brain drain raises a number of major issues that are specific to it. 
1.  While trade imbalances put in motion mechanisms to restore equilibrium between 
exports and imports – including exchange rate movements, such mechanisms do not 
necessarily exist in the case of the movement of skilled labor. Due to technological 
and institutional differences, migration need not reduce the wage gap between source 
and host countries. On the contrary, human capital externalities (Lucas 1988) 
associated with skilled labor migration might even raise the skilled wage gap between 
source and host countries. 
2.  Human capital is typically considered to be an important element of the engine of 
growth. If skilled emigration is not compensated by skilled immigration – an unlikely 
outcome for most developing source countries -- or by stronger human capital 
accumulation, source countries may gradually lose their capacity to develop. 
3.  Though the new literature on the brain drain suggests that skilled emigration may 
induces positive feedback effects for sending countries (including remittances, 
increased trade, transfer of knowledge and behavioral modes
2), these tend to be 
dominated by the direct effect of the brain drain on the stock of human capital (see 
Beine et al, 2006). 
 
1.  SMALL STATES 
There are many possible ways of defining small states. One can use various criteria 
(population, GDP, territory size), as well as various thresholds and base years. Unsurprisingly, 
these criteria are strongly correlated
3 as cross-country differences are well preserved over 
time. Here we use the population size in 2000 
There is no special significance in the selection of a particular population threshold to define 
small states. Indeed, the Commonwealth, in its work on small states, uses a threshold of 1.5 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
2 See Fargues (2006) on the impact of international migration on fertility in the sending countries.  
3 In 2000, the correlation rate between population and GDP amounted to 78%, and 84% between population and 
size. 
  2million people, but it also includes larger member countries (Jamaica, Lesotho, Namibia and 
Papua New Guinea) because they share many of the same characteristics of smallness. The 
World Bank Task Force on small states uses the same threshold as a convenient yardstick for 
classifying all small states, and only consider sovereign states.  
Using the standard of a population below 1.5 million people in 2000, 45 developing countries 
are small (see Alphabetical list of small states by population, population rank & GNP per 
capita), accounting for nearly one third of the total number of developing countries. They are 
home to 20 million people, less than 0.4 percent of the total population of developing 
countries. They range in size from “micro-states” like Cook Islands, Nauru, Niue, Palau, St. 
Kitts and Nevis, and Tuvalu (with fewer than 50,000 people each) to Botswana, Gabon, The 
Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritius, and Trinidad and Tobago (with more than 1 million 
people each). The per capita GNP in these countries also ranges widely, from less than $400 
in several African countries (Comoros, The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, and Sao Tome and 
Principe) to just $700-1,300 in such countries as Cape Verde, Guyana, Kiribati, Maldives, 
Solomon Islands, and Tuvalu; to more than $9,000 (The Bahamas, Brunei, Cyprus, Malta, and 
Qatar). There are small states in every geographic region, but most countries fall into three 
main groups: twelve states are in the Caribbean region, fourteen in East Asia and Pacific, and 
twelve in Africa. Of the remaining seven countries, two are in South Asia, two in the Middle 
East, and three in Europe. 
 
2.  A NEW DATABASE ON EMIGRATION RATES BY EDUCATIONAL 
ATTAINMENT 
This section describes the methodology and data sources used to compute emigration stocks 
and rates by educational attainment and by origin country in 1990 and 2000. In what follows, 
the term ''country'' usually designates independent states whilst ''dependent territory'' refers to 
other entities attached to a particular independent state. Our 2000 data set distinguishes 192 
independent  territories (Vatican and the 191 UN member states, including East Timor which 
became independent in 2002) and 39 dependent territories.  
Stocks are provided for both types of territories while rates are only provided for independent 
countries as well as three dependent territories which are treated as countries (Hong Kong, 
Macao and Taiwan) and one occupied territory (Palestine). Since most Korean migrants to the 
USA did not accurately report their origin, we cannot distinguish between North and South 
  3Korea (estimates are provided for Korea as a whole). We distinguish 174 countries in 1990, 
before the secession of the Soviet block, ex-Yugoslavia, ex-Czechoslovakia, the independence 
of Eritrea and East-Timor, and the German and Yemen reunifications
4. 
For economic and statistical reasons, working on stocks is more attractive than working on 
flows. Stock variables are more appropriate to analyze the endogeneity and the dynamics of 
migration movements (the equilibrium values are often expressed in terms of stocks). 
Regarding statistics, it has long been recognized that migration flow data are less reliable than 
stock data, due to the impossibility of evaluating emigration and return migration movements. 
We count as migrants all working-aged (25 and over) foreign-born individuals living in an 
OECD country
5. Skilled migrants are those with at least tertiary educational attainment 
wherever they completed their schooling. Our methodology proceeds in two steps. We first 
compute emigration stocks by educational attainment from all countries of the world. Then, 
we evaluate these numbers in percentage of the total labor force born in the sending country 
(including the migrants themselves). This definition deserves two main comments. 
First, the set of receiving countries is restricted to OECD nations. Compared to existing works 
(such as Trends in International Migration - see OECD, 2002), our database provides many 
insights about the structure of South-North and North-North migration. Generally speaking, 
the skill level of immigrants in non-OECD countries is expected to be very low, except in a 
few countries such as South Africa (1.3 million immigrants in 2000), the six member states of 
the Gulf Cooperation Council (9.6 million immigrants in Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, 
Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman and Qatar), some Eastern Asian countries (4 million immigrants in 
Hong-Kong and Singapore only). According to their census and survey data, about 17.5 
percent of adult immigrants are tertiary educated in these countries (17 percent in Bahrain, 
17.2 percent in Saudi Arabia, 14 percent in Kuwait, 18.7 percent in South Africa).  
Considering that children constitute 25 percent of the immigration stock, we estimate the 
number of educated workers at 1.9 million in these countries. The number of educated 
immigrants in the rest of the world lies between 1 and 4 million (if the average proportion of 
educated immigrants among adults lies between 2.5 and 10 percent). This implies that 
focusing on OECD countries, we should capture a large fraction of the world-wide educated 
migration (about 90 percent). Nevertheless, we are aware that by disregarding non-OECD 
                                                           
4 Note that we report 1990 estimates for a couple of countries which became independent after January 1, 1990 
(Namibia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau). 
5 Our working-aged concept includes retirees. 
  4immigration countries, we probably underestimate the brain drain for a dozen of developing 
countries (such as Egypt, Sudan, Jordan, Yemen, Pakistan or Bangladesh in the neighborhood 
of the Gulf states, Swaziland, Namibia, Zimbabwe and other countries which send emigrants 
to South Africa, etc.). Incorporating data collected from selected non-OECD countries could 
refine the data set. 
Second, we have no systematic information on the age of entry. It is therefore impossible to 
distinguish between immigrants who were educated at the time of their arrival and those who 
acquired education after they settled in the receiving country; for example, Mexican-born 
individuals who arrived in the US at age 5 or 10 and graduated from US high-education 
institutions are counted as highly-skilled immigrants. Hence, our definition of the brain drain 
is partly determined by data availability. Existing data do not allow us to systematically 
eliminate foreign-born individuals who arrived with completed schooling or after a given age 
threshold. In the US, the proportion of foreign born individuals who arrived before age 10 
represents 10 percent of the immigration stock (16 percent for those who arrived before age 
16). This average proportion amounts to 13 percent among skilled immigrants (20.4 for age 
16).  
Important differences are observed across countries. The share is important for high income 
and Central American countries (about 20 percent). It is quite low for Asian and African 
countries (about 9 percent). Having no systematic data for the other receiving countries, we 
cannot control for familial immigration. Our data base includes these individuals who arrived 
at young age. Our choice is also motivated by another reason. It is impossible to quantify the 
share of these young immigrants who were partly educated in their birth country and/or who 
arrived with foreign fellowships. Young immigrants who spent part of their primary or 
secondary schooling in the origin country, or who got foreign schooling fellowships induced a 
fiscal loss for their origin country. 
 
2.1. Emigration stocks 
It is well documented that statistics provided by origin countries do not provide a realistic 
picture of emigration. When available, they are incomplete and imprecise
6. Whilst detailed 
immigration data are not easy to collect on an homogeneous basis, information on emigration 
                                                           
6 Bhorat et al. (2002) compare South African emigration data to immigration numbers collected in five important 
receiving countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, UK and USA). They show that the emigration sum was 
approximately 3 times larger than South African official statistics. 
  5can only be captured by aggregating consistent immigration data collected in receiving 
countries. Information about the origin and skill of natives and immigrants is available from 
national population censuses and registers. More specifically, country i's census usually 
identifies individuals on the basis of age, country of birth j, and skill level s. Our method 
consists in collecting census or register data from a large set of receiving countries, with the 
highest level of detail on birth countries and (at least) three levels of educational attainment: 
s=h for high-skilled, s=m for medium-skilled, s=l for low-skilled and s=u for the unknowns. 
Let   denote the stock of working-aged individuals born in j, of skill s, living in country i 





Low-skilled workers are those with primary education (or with 0 to 8 years of schooling 
completed); medium-skilled workers are those with secondary education (9 to 12 years of 
schooling); high-skilled workers are those with tertiary education (13 years and above). The 
unknowns are either due to the fact that some immigrants did not declare their educational 
attainment or to the absence of data on education in some receiving countries. Educational 
categories are built on the basis of country specific information and are compatible with 
human capital indicators available for all sending countries. A mapping between the country 
educational classification is sometimes required to harmonize the data
7.  
By focusing on census and register data, our methodology does not capture illegal 
immigration for which systematic statistics by education level and country of origin are not 
available. According to the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Services, the illegal 
population residing in the United States amounted to 3.5 million in January 1990 and 7.0 
million in January 2000. It is even possible to identify the main countries of origin (in 2000, 
68.7 percent were from Mexico, 2.7 from El Salvador, 2.1 from Guatemala, 2.0 from 
Colombia and Honduras, etc.)
8. However, there is no accurate data about the educational 
structure of these illegal migrants. For the other member states of the OECD, data on illegal 
immigration are less reliable or do not exist. By disregarding illegal migrants, we probably 
overestimate the average level of education of the immigrant population (it can be reasonably 
assumed that most illegal immigrants are uneducated). Nevertheless, this limit should not 
significantly distort our estimates of the migration rate of highly-skilled workers.
9  
                                                           
7 For example, Australian data mix information about the highest degree and the number of years of schooling. 
8 See http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/aboutus/statistics/III Report 1211.pdf. 
9 Note that the problem may not be that important for estimation of brain drain determinants because results do 
not depend on the extent or share of illegal migrants but rather on their cross-country difference. Hence, 
  6As far as possible, we turn our attention to the homogeneity and the comparability of the data. 
This induces a couple of methodological choices: 
  To allow comparisons between 1990 and 2000, we consider the same 30 receiving 
countries in 1990 and 2000. Consequently, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Korea, Poland, 
Mexico and Turkey are considered as receiving countries in 1990 despite the fact that they 
were not members of the OECD. item  Migration is defined on the basis of the country of 
birth rather than citizenship. Whilst citizenship characterizes the foreign population, the 
concept of foreign-born better captures the decision to emigrate
10. Usually, the number of 
foreign-born is much higher than the number of foreign citizens (twice as large in 
countries such as Hungary, the Netherlands, and Sweden)
11. Another reason is that the 
concept of country of birth is time invariant (contrary to citizenship which changes with 
naturalization) and independent of the changes in policies regarding naturalization. The 
OECD statistics report that 14.4 million of foreign born individuals were naturalized 
between 1991 and 2000. Countries with a particularly high number of acquisitions of 
citizenship are the US (5.6 million), Germany (2.2 million), Canada (1.6 million), and 
Australia and France (1.1 million). Despite the fact that they are partially reported in 
traditional statistics (OECD, 2002), the number of foreign-born can be obtained for a large 
majority of OECD countries. In a limited number of cases, the national census only gives 
immigrants' citizenship (Germany, Italy, Greece, Japan and Korea). As it will appear in 
Table 2, 88.3 percent of working-aged immigrants can be characterized in term of country 
of birth in 2000 (11.7 percent in term of citizenship). Contrary to common belief, data 
availability is not significantly different in 1990, even among European states. We obtain 
information about country of birth for 88.0 percent of working-aged immigrants in 1990 
(12.0 in term of citizenship). 
  It is worth noting that the concept of foreign born is not fully homogeneous across OECD 
countries. As in many OECD countries, our main criterion relies on both country of birth 
and citizenship at birth: we define foreign born as an individual born abroad with foreign 
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j m j i,
estimation is unaffected if the shares are constant across countries or if the difference between the share   in 
country i and   in country j is equal to a random (white noise) variable, ∀ , i.e., for i A i m m ε + = A
i
, with m  
is the average share, ε  is an “iid” random (white noise) variable.  
10 In some receiving countries such as Germany, immigrants' children (i.e. the second generation) usually keep 
their foreign citizenship. 
11 By contrast, in other OECD countries with a restricted access to nationality (such as Japan, Korea, and 
Switzerland), the foreign population is important (about 20 percent in Switzerland). 
  7citizenship at birth. For example, the U.S Census Bureau considers as natives persons 
born in the US (as well as in Puerto Rico or U.S. Island areas), or born abroad from a U.S. 
citizen parent
12. Other residents are considered foreign born. France and Denmark use a 
imilar concept. Statistics Netherlands defines first-generation immigrants as persons who 
are born abroad and have at least one parent who is also born abroad (Alders M., 2001). 
However, in a couple of countries (Australia, New Zealand, and Belgium), the " foreign 
born" concept used by the Statistics Institute essentially means " overseas-born" , i.e. an 
individual simply born abroad. Whilst it is impossible to use a fully comparable concept 
of immigration, we have tried to maximize the homogeneity of our data sources. It is 
worth noting that our definition clearly excludes the second generation of immigrants. A 
couple of countries offer a more detailed picture of immigration, distinguishing the 
foreign born and those with foreign background (basically immigrants' descendants born 
locally from one of two foreign-born parents)
13. 
  As discussed above, emigration rates are provided for 195 territories in 2000 (191 UN 
member states, Vatican, Palestine, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macao minus one Korean 
country). The world configuration has changed between 1990 and 2000. Czechoslovakia 
seceded into the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, the ex-USSR seceded into 15 
countries (7 on the European continent and 8 on the Asian continent), Ex-Yugoslavia 
seceded into 5 countries, Eritrea and East Timor emerged as a independent countries in 
1993 and 2002. On the contrary, Germany and Yemen were unified. Consequently, we 
distinguish 174 countries in 1990 (the ex-USSR replaces 15 countries, ex-Yugoslavia 
replaces 5 countries, ex-Czechoslovakia replaces 2 countries). For homogeneity reasons, 
we aggregated East and West Germany as well as the Democratic Republic and the 
Republic Yemen in 1990. In 1990, the ex-USSR totally belongs to the European area
14. 
  A related issue concerns the dependent territories. Each dependent territory is linked to a 
nation. Individuals born in these territories have the unrestricted right to move to and to 
live in the nation. We naturally consider them as natives of the sovereign nation. Once the 
concept of foreign born is chosen, it means that they should not be considered as 
immigrants if they move to the sovereign state (internal migration). They should only be 
considered as immigrants if they move to another independent state (external migration). 
                                                           
12 See Malone et al. (2003) for more details. 
13 Data by foreign background are provided in the Netherlands, France and Scandinavian countries. See Alders 
(2001) for the Netherlands or Ostby (2002) for Norway. 
  8This criterion is especially important for U.S. dependent territories (such as Puerto Rico 
and the US Island Areas such as Guam, etc.), UK overseas territories (Bermuda, Anguilla, 
etc.), French dependent territories (such as Guadalupe, Reunion, etc.), Denmark (Greeland 
and Faroe Islands, etc.) or around Australia and New-Zealand (Cook Islands, Niue, 
Tokelau, etc.).  
  For example, in accordance with the US Census Bureau definition, we consider that one 
million of Puerto Ricans living in the United States are U.S. natives but not immigrants. 
This considerably reduces the total stock of Puerto Rican emigrants. We have computed 
on the same basis the emigration stock for the other dependent territories, except for 
Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao which are assimilated to independent countries. Then, 
given the small numbers obtained, we have eliminated Northern Mariana Islands and 
Western Sahara (a disputed rather than dependent territory) and have summed up Jersey 
and Guernsey (forming Channel Islands). Stock data for 33 dependent territories are 
provided in Table A.3.  
  As the second step of our analysis consists in comparing the numbers of emigrants and 
residents by educational attainment, we have to consider homogeneous groups. Working 
on the working-aged population (aged 25 and over) maximizes the comparability of the 
immigration population with data on educational attainment in source countries. It also 
excludes a large number of students who temporarily emigrate to complete their 
education. We cannot control for graduate students aged 25 and over completing their 
schooling
15. As it will appear in Table 1 the age group is slightly different in a limited 
number of countries.  
Building an aggregate measure of emigration per educational attainment requires a rule for 
sharing the unknown values. At the OECD level, the number of migrants whose educational 
attainment is not described amounts to 1.287 million, i.e. 2.2 percent of the total stock. Two 
reasonable rules could be considered: either unknown values can be distributed in the same 
way as the known values or they can be assimilated as unskilled. We combine both rules 
depending on the information available in the receiving country. For receiving countries 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
14 Note that aggregating appropriated stock data would allow computation of emigration rates for ex-Yugoslavia, 
the ex-USSR and ex-Czechoslovakia in 2000. 
15 Carrington and Detragiache (1998) used data from the Institute of International Education to estimate the 
number of graduate students completing their schooling in the United States. We consider that some of these 
students aged 25 and over receive grants and can be considered as workers (researchers). 
  9where information about immigrants' education is available, we assimilate the unknowns to 
unskilled workers
16.  
For example, Australian immigrants who did not mention their educational attainment are 
considered unskilled. In receiving countries where no information about skill is available, we 
transpose the skill distribution observed in the rest of the OECD area or in the neighboring 
region. For example, if we have no information about the skill structure of immigrants to 
Iceland, Algerian emigrants to Iceland are assumed to be distributed in the same way as 
Algerian emigrants to the rest of the Scandinavian countries. The assumptions will be 
discussed below. 


























































































































where   is a (time and country dependent) binary variable equal to one if there is no data on 




                                                           
16 Country specific data by occupation reveal that the occupational structure of those with unknown education is 
very similar to the structure of low-skilled workers (and strongly different from that of high-skilled workers). 
See Debuisson et al. (2004) on Belgian data. 
  10Table 1. Data sources 
1990 (+)  2000 (+) 
Country - Age group  Origin  Education  Origin  Education 
Australia (25+)  Census (#)  Census (#)  Census (#)  Census (#) 
Austria  (25+)  Census Census Census Census 
Belgium (25+)  Census  Census  Improved EC 
(**) 
LFS 
Canada (25+)  Census (#)  Census (#)  Census (#)  Census (#) 
Czech Rep (25+)  Census (#)  -  Census (#)  Census (#) 
Denmark (25+)  Register  Register Register Register 
Finland (25+)  Register  Register Register Register 
France (25+)  Census (#)  Census (#)  Census (#)  Census (#) 








Greece (25+)  EC (Cit)  LFS (Cit.) EC  (Cit) LFS  (Cit.) 
Hungary (All;25+)  EC (Cit)  -  Census  Census 
Iceland  (All) Register - Register - 
Ireland  (25+)  Census Census Census Census 
Italy (25+)  EC (Cit)  -  Census (Cit)  Census (Cit) 
Japan (All/25+)  Register (Cit)  -  Census (Cit)  - 
Korea (All)  Register (Cit)  -  Register (Cit)  - 
Luxemburg (25+)  Census (#)  Census (#)  Census (#)  Census (#) 
Mexico (25+)  Ipums (+) 10%  Ipums (+) 10%  Ipums (+) 10.6%  Ipums (+) 10.6%
Netherland  (All) Census* Census* Census* Census* 
New  Zealand  (15+)  Census Census Census Census 
Norway (25+)  Register  Register Register Register 
Poland (13+)  Census (#)   -   Census (#)  Census (#) 
Portugal  (25+) Census LFS Census LFS 
Slovak Rep (25+)  See Czech Rep  See Czech Rep  Census (#)  Census (#) 
Spain  (25+)  Census Census Census Census 
Sweden  (25+)  Census Census Census Census 
Switzerland (18+)  Census (#)  Census (#)  Census (#)  Census (#) 
Turkey (15+)  Census (#)  Census (#)  Census (#)  Census (#) 
United Kingdom 
(15+) 
Census* Census* Census* Census* 
United States (25+)  Ipums (+) 5%  Ipums(+) 5%  Census 100%*  Census 100%* 
Notes: EC = European Council (register data); LFS = Labor Force Survey; (*) = limited level of detail. 
(**) European Council data corrected by the country specific "foreign born/foreign citizen" ratio in Census 1991. 
(+) Year around 1990 and 2000 (for example, the Australian censuses refer to 1991 and 2001) 
(#) Data available in Release 1.0. 
(+) See Ruggles et al. (2004) on the US and Sobek et al. (2002) on the Mexican sample. 
 
 
In 2000, we use census, microcensus and register data for 29 countries. European Council 
data are used in the case of Greece. Information on the country of birth are available for the 
large majority of countries, representing 88.3 percent of the OECD immigration stock. 
  11Information on citizenship are used for the other countries (Germany, Italy, Greece, Japan, 
and Korea). The educational structure can be obtained in 24 countries and can be estimated in 
3 additional countries on the basis of the European Labor Force Survey (Belgium, Greece, 
and Portugal). As will appear in Table 2, data built on the Labor Force Survey only represent 
2 percent of the OECD migration stock in 2000 (0.7 percent in 1990). In the 3 remaining 
countries, the educational structure is extrapolated on the basis of the Scandinavian countries 
(for Iceland) or the rest of the OECD (for Japan and Korea). In 1990, European Council data 
must be used for Hungary and Italy. These data are based on the concept of citizenship. 
Compared to 2000, educational attainment is not available in Italy, the Czech Republic and 
Hungary. The Italian educational structure is based on the rest of the EU15. For the other two 
countries, we use proportions computed from the rest of Europe. On the contrary, the Belgian 
1991 Census is available and provides complete data by country of birth and educational 
attainment.  
 
2.2. Emigration rates 
In the spirit of Carrington and Detragiache (1998) and Adams (2003), our second step consists 
in comparing the emigration stocks to the total number of people born in the source country 
and belonging to the same educational category. Calculating the brain drain as a proportion of 
the total educated labor force is a better strategy to evaluate the pressure imposed on the local 
labor market. It is indeed obvious that the pressure exerted by 1,037,000 Indian skilled 
emigrants (4.3% of the educated total labor force) is less important than the pressure exerted 
by 16,000 skilled emigrants from Grenada (85% of the educated labor force).  
Denote   as the stock of individuals aged 25+, of skill s, living in country j, at time t, we 
define the emigration rates by  
j
s t N ,














  12In particular,   provides information about the intensity of the brain drain in the source 
country j. It measures the fraction of skilled agents born in country j and living in (other) 
OECD countries
j
h t m ,
17. 
This step requires using data on the size and the skill structure of the working-aged population 
in the countries of origin. Population data by age are provided by the United Nations
18. We 
focus on the population aged 25 and more. Data are missing for a couple of countries but can 
be estimated using the CIA world factbook
19. Population data are split across educational 
groups using international human capital indicators. Several sources based on attainment 
and/or enrollment variables can be found in the literature. These data sets suffer from two 
important limitations. First, data sets published in the nineties reveal a number of suspicious 
features and inconsistencies
20. Second, given the variety of educational systems around the 
world, they are subject to serious comparability problems.  
Three major competing data sets are available: Barro and Lee (2000), Cohen and Soto (2001) 
and De La Fuente and Domenech (2002). The first two sets depict the educational structure in 
both developed and developing countries. The latter only focuses on 21 OECD countries. 
Statistical comparisons between these sets reveal that the highest signal/noise ratio is obtained 
in De La Fuente and Domenech. These tests are conducted in OECD countries. Regarding 
developing countries, Cohen and Soto's set outperforms Barro and Lee's set in growth 
regressions. However, Cohen and Soto's data for Africa clearly underestimate official 
statistics. According to the South African 1996 census, the share of educated individuals 
amounts to 7.2 percent. Cohen and Soto report 3 percent (Barro and Lee report 6.9 percent). 
The Kenyan 1999 census gives 2 percent whilst Cohen and Soto report 0.9 percent (1.2 for 
Barro and Lee). 
Generally speaking, the Cohen and Soto data set predicts extremely low levels of human 
capital for African countries
21 (the share of tertiary educated is lower than 1 percent in a large 
number of African countries) and a couple of other non-OECD countries
22. The Barro and Lee 
                                                           
17 For some countries, immigrants often travel back and forth between their new and old countries (e.g. Mexico). 
They are likely to be counted as still being residents in their home country. For that reason, Carrington and 
Detragiache (1998) provide an upper bound (m=M/N) and a lower bound (m=M/(N+M)). Since the upper bound 
is not interpretable for a large number of countries (higher than one), we only report the lower bound. 
18 See http://esa.un.org/unpp. 
19 See http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook. 
20 This partly explains why human capital did not prove to be significant or distort the " good sign" in growth 
regressions. 
21 For this reason, Cohen and Soto (2001) exclude African countries from their growth regressions. 
22 In Cyprus, the 2001 census gives 22%, compared with 4.6% in Cohen and Soto (17.1% in Barro and Lee). 
  13estimates seem closer to the African official statistics. As the brain drain is particularly 
important in African countries, Barro and Lee indicators are preferable. Consequently, data 
for   are taken from De La Fuente and Domenech (2002) for OECD countries and from 
Barro and Lee (2000) for non-OECD countries. For countries where Barro and Lee measures 
are missing (about 70 countries in 2000), we transpose the skill sharing of the neighboring 
country with the closest human development index regarding education. This method gives 
good approximations of the brain drain rate, broadly consistent with anecdotal evidence. 
j
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2.3. Changes between 1990 and 2000 
The number of skilled migrants has drastically increased in recent decades. This is partly 
explained by the many “quality-selective” policies that were introduced in OECD countries in 
the 1980s and 1990s. The stock of high-skilled immigrants residing in the OECD increased by 
70% between 1990 and 2000, while that of unskilled immigrants increased by only 30% 
during the same period (Docquier and Marfouk, 2006). However, this rapid increase in the 
stock of skilled migrants does not imply that the rate of skilled migration increased at a 
similar rate because the last decade was also characterized by a sharp rise in the educational 
attainment in sending countries. Consequently, as shown in the Docquier-Marfouk's database, 
the brain drain only experienced a minor change between 1990 and 2000 (from 5.0 to 5.4 
percent).  
 
3.  RESULTS FOR SMALL STATES 
Table 2 presents information on skilled and average emigration rates, and on the schooling 
gap (defined below), for 1990, the period 1990-2000, and for 2000, with focus on small states. 
The data are provided for small states as a whole, and grouped according to population size, 
region and income, and for small developing island states. The emigration rates are also 
provided for other country groupings, including those with somewhat larger population, the 
world, and for high-income countries and developing countries as a whole.  
Table 2 presents a number of interesting findings. We start with those associated with the 
skilled emigration rate (first column). 
  144.1. Skilled Emigration Rate
First, the skilled emigration rate or brain drain shows a dramatic difference in the extent of the 
brain drain -- or skilled migration rate -- for small states relative to that for developing 
countries as a whole. In 1990, the small states’ brain drain was equal to 50% and that for 
developing countries as a whole was 7.8% or less than 16% of the former. Similarly, the small 
states’ brain drain in 1990-2000 was 36.1% and that for developing countries as a whole was 
7.0% or less than 20% of the former. Finally, the small states’ brain drain was equal to 43.2% 
in 2000 and that for developing countries as a whole was 7.4% or less than 18% of the former. 
Second, the brain drain for small states is even larger when compared with the world as a 
whole or with high-income countries. The brain drain in high-income countries was 3.8% or 
7.6% of that of the small states in 1990, and 3.5% or 8.1% of the small states’ brain drain in 
2000. As for the world average, the corresponding numbers are 5.2% in 1990 and 5.3% in 
2000, or 10.4% and 12.3% of the small states’ brain drain, respectively.   
Third, though the small states’ brain drain has been extremely large in recent decades (with 
the 1990 figure reflecting preceding brain drain episodes), it has been declining. The decline 
from 50% in 1990 to 43.2% in 2000 amounts to a 13.6% reduction in a decade. This is a 
major change, considering that these figures relate to stocks.  
Fourth, Table 2 also presents a disaggregation of the small states into three groups according 
to population size P (in millions). These are referred to here as Group 1 (P < .5), Group 2 (.5 < 
P < 1), and Group 3 (1 < P < 1.5). The brain drain in Groups 1 and 2 was 46% in 1990 and 
69% in Group 3. The latter was thus 50% larger than the former two. The opposite holds in 
2000, with the brain drain in Group 3 (40.9%) lower than that in Group 1 (41.7%) and in 
Group 2 (47.2%). The 40% reduction in the brain drain of Group 3 from 68.9% in 1990 to 
40.9% in 2000 is due to a 60% decline in the period 1990-2000 (from 68.9% to 28.3%). Thus, 
the decrease in small states’ brain drain from 50% to 43.2% was essentially due the decline in 
Group 3.
23  
Fifth, Table 2 presents two other groups according to population, referred to here as Group 4 
with 1.5 < P < 3, and Group 5 with 3 < P < 4. The brain drain in Group 4 was half of that in 
small states in 1990 (25% versus 50%) and about half in 2000 (20.9% versus 43.2%), while 
that in Group 5 was 41.4% of that in small states in 1990 (20.7% versus 50%) and 42.8% in 
                                                           
23 Group 2 experienced a 3% brain drain increase from 1990 to 2000 (from 45.8 to 47.2%) and Group 1 
experienced a 9% decrease (from 46 to 41.7%).      
  152000. In other words, the size of the brain drain exhibited a negative relationship with respect 
to population size. It was greater for small states as a whole, smaller by about half in Group 4, 
and again smaller (by close to 60%) in Group 5.  
Sixth, the brain drain for small island developing states was similar to that for small states as a 
whole. It is 10% smaller that the latter in 1990 (45% versus 50%) and 2% smaller in 2000 
(42.4% versus 43.2%).       
Seventh, Table 2 also presents a disaggregation of small states by region and income. The 
brain drain in 1990 was largest in Latin America and the Caribbean (75.4%) and in East Asia 
and the Pacific (74.2%), smaller in Sub-Saharan Africa (43.3%) and smallest in high-income 
countries (24.9%). The figures are similar in 2000, except for East Asia and the Pacific where 
the brain drain declined dramatically, from 74.2% in 1990 to 50.8% in 2000 or by over 30%, 
due to a huge reduction (by 56%) in the brain drain in 1990-2000 compared to 1990.     
 
4.2. Schooling Gap
Table 2 also provides information on the “Schooling gap,” which we now define. First, in 
order to simplify notation, equation (2) is reproduced here as equation (2’) where the time 
subscript t and the country superscript j have been deleted. Then, the skilled emigration rate or 








= ,  
where   is the stock of skilled migrants aged 25+, and   is the stock of skilled 
individuals aged 25+ living in their country of birth.  
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where M is the stock of migrants aged 25+, and N is the population of individuals aged 25+ 
living in their country of birth. The schooling gap SG is defined as the share of the skilled in 
the migrant population divided by the share of the skilled in the total population, i.e.:  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 























Thus, the schooling gap – shown in the third column of Table 3 for each period -- can also be 
interpreted as the skilled migration rate   divided by the average migration rate m, i.e., as 
/m. Below are a few results from Table 2.  
h m
h m
First, the schooling gap for small states as a whole was 3.34 in 1990. It was much higher in 
Group 3, the largest of the small states groups (1 < P < 1.5), with a value of 7.65 or some 
130% greater than that for small states as a whole. The schooling gap was about the same for 
Group 2 as for small states as a whole (3.21 versus 3.34 or 4% less), and was 2.27 for Group 1 
or 32% smaller than that for small states as a whole. Thus, the schooling gap within the small 
states groups was inversely related to the population size, and the same held for 2000. 
Second, the schooling gap for small states was very close to the world average both in 1990 
and 2000. It was greater than for high income countries (by some 165% in 1990 and 120% in 
2000) and was smaller than for developing countries as a whole (by over 20% in 1990 and by 
over 30% in 2000).  
Third, the small states schooling gap fell from 3.34 in 1990 to 2.81 in 2000 or by some 16%, 
about the same percentage decline as that for the brain drain, the reason being that the average 
emigration rate remained about the same (changing by only 2%, from 15.0 to 15.3%). It also 
fell in Groups 1, 2 and 3, with that of Group 3 exhibiting a dramatic decline from 7.65 in 1990 
to 4.20 in 2000 or by 45%. The latter was the main cause that the schooling gap declined for 
small states as a whole.  
Fourth, the 1990 schooling gap was extremely high in Sub-Saharan Africa at 8.31, was high 
for East Asia and the Pacific at 4.38, and was much lower for Latin America and the 
Caribbean at 2.52, with the lowest for high-income countries at 2.07. These schooling gaps 
were, respectively, 150% greater, over 30% greater, 25% smaller and 38% smaller than that 
for small states as a whole. The schooling gaps fell for all three developing regions, with their 
order unchanged, except for the high income group where it increased some. Importantly, it 
fell significantly in Sub-Saharan Africa, from 8.31 to 6.95 or by 16.4%, slightly more than the 
15.8% decrease for small states as a whole.  
Fifth, the decline in the schooling gap was about twice as large for developing countries as a 
whole as for the small states, with a reduction from 7.18 in 1990 to 4.92 in 2000 or by 31.5%, 
  17compared to a reduction of 15.8% for the small states. The greater reduction for the former 
was certainly not due to the reduction in the brain drain which was in fact greater for small 
states (13.6% versus 4.4%). Rather, it was due to a significant increase in the average 
emigration rate from 1.1 to 1.5% or by 36%, compared to a 2% increase for small states. 
Sixth, the schooling gap for high-income countries remained constant between 1990 and 2000 
at about 1.26 and fell for the world as a whole from 3.316 to 2.993 or by 8.8%. The world 
average schooling gap was equal to that for small states in 1990 and some 6% greater in 2000.   
Seventh, note that the reduction in the schooling gap should be considered a benefit for source 
countries in the sense that the difference between the skill intensity of emigration   and 
that of the population as a whole 
M M h /
) /( ) ( M N M N h h + +  decreases (see equation 4). The reason 
is that the brain drain should be less harmful for source countries because of their relatively 
greater supply, either because of a reduction in the share of skilled labor in migration or 
because of an increase in the share of skilled labor in the population (including the migrants 
themselves). This was the case for all country groupings except for high-income small states 
and high-income countries as a whole.     
  Eighth, skilled immigrants are defined as foreign-born workers with university or post-
secondary training living abroad. This definition does not distinguish between education 
acquired in the home or in the host country. Rosenzweig (2005) shows on the basis of US 
survey data that migration of children represent an important fraction of total migration for 
certain countries. On average, 18 percent of permanent resident aliens immigrated to the US 
before eighteen and over twenty 25 immigrated before twenty. Among these, some are highly-
skilled today, having most likely acquired a higher education after coming to the US. 
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Table 2. Emigration rates by country group 
 
                    2000 1990 2000/1990


























Small States (pop < 1.5 
million) 
46                    43.2% 15.3% 2.812 50.0% 15.0% 3.339 36.1% 16.2% 2.228
          by population size             
Population from 0 to 0.5 million  32                    41.7% 21.0% 1.984 46.0% 20.2% 2.274 35.9% 24.1% 1.491
Population from 0.5 to 1 million  8                    47.2% 15.7% 3.007 45.8% 14.3% 3.213 49.3% 19.0% 2.591
Population from 1 to 1.5 million  6                    40.9% 9.8% 4.198 68.9% 9.0% 7.646 28.3% 10.8% 2.617
         by region / income             
East Asia and Pacific  12                    50.8% 17.0% 2.986 74.2% 16.9% 4.381 32.6% 17.2% 1.900
Latin America and Caribbean  10                    74.9% 35.0% 2.143 75.4% 30.0% 2.515 74.3% 51.4% 1.446
Sub-Saharan Africa  10                    41.7% 6.0% 6.947 43.3% 5.2% 8.307 39.6% 8.5% 4.649
High-income countries  12                    23.0% 10.7% 2.144 24.9% 12.0% 2.073 19.4% 5.3% 3.675
 
Other Groups of Interest 
           
Small Islands Developing States  37                    42.4% 13.8% 3.073 45.0% 11.8% 3.808 39.4% 20.0% 1.965
Population from 1.5 to 3 million  15                    20.9% 7.1% 2.960 25.0% 5.7% 4.366 18.5% 8.7% 2.125
Population from 3 to 4 million  13                   
                   
18.5% 10.0% 1.849 20.7% 11.1% 1.874 16.7% 8.8% 1.904
World average  192 5.3% 1.8% 2.993 5.2% 1.6% 3.316 5.4% 2.4% 2.309
Total high-income countries  41                    3.5% 2.8% 1.264 3.8% 3.0% 1.258 2.9% 1.2% 2.529
Total developing countries  151                    7.4% 1.5% 4.916 7.8% 1.1% 7.182 7.0% 2.5% 2.831
Skilled emigration rates and average emigration rates are defined by equation (2). 
Schooling gap = Skilled emigration rate / Average emigration rate 
Source : Docquier and Marfouk (2006) 
 
 
  194.  ALTERNATIVE MEASURES CONTROLLING FOR AGE OF 
ENTRY 
The previous data on international skilled migration define skilled immigrants as foreign-born 
workers with university or post-secondary training. However, this definition does not account 
for whether education has been acquired in the home or in the host country and thus leads to a 
potential over-estimation of the intensity of the brain drain as well as to possible spurious 
cross-country variation in skilled emigration rates.  
As shown by Rosenzweig (2005) on the basis of US survey data, children migration can 
represent an important fraction of total immigration for certain countries as over 18 percent of 
permanent resident aliens immigrated to the US before age 18, and over 25 percent 
immigrated before age 20. Among those who arrived before age 18 or 20, some are highly-
skilled today, having most likely acquired education once in the US. Should we include them 
as part of the ''brain drain''? 
As explained, existing brain drain data sets are built according to a broad definition in that 
they include all foreign-born workers with tertiary schooling; for example, Mexican-born 
individuals who arrived in the US at age 5 or 10 and then graduated from US high-education 
institutions later on are counted as highly-skilled Mexican immigrants. This can be seen as 
providing an upper bound to brain drain estimates.  
In contrast, it has been suggested that only people with home-country higher education should 
be considered as skilled immigrants (Rosenzweig 2005). This must be considered as a lower-
bound measure of the brain drain. Indeed, except for those arrived at very young age, most of 
the immigrants who then acquired host country tertiary education arrived with some level of 
home country pre-tertiary schooling. In addition, some of them would still have engaged in 
higher education in the home country in the absence of emigration prospects. 
In this section, we use immigrants' age of entry as a proxy for where education has been 
acquired. Data on age of entry are available from a subset of receiving countries which 
together represent more than three-quarters of total skilled immigration to the OECD. Using 
these data and a simple gravity model, we estimate the age-of-entry structure of skilled 
immigration to the other OECD countries. This allows us to propose alternative measures of 
the brain drain by defining skilled immigrants as those who left their home country after age 
12, 18 or 22, and to do so for both 1990 and 2000. These corrected skilled emigration rates, 
which can be seen as intermediate bounds to the brain drain estimates, are by construction 
  20lower than those computed without age-of-entry restrictions by Docquier and Marfouk 
(2006), which we take as our upper-bound brain drain measure. 
 
4.1.  Methdology 
To estimate the structure of immigration by age of entry, we collect census and register data 
in a sample of countries where such information is available: the US 1990 and 2000 censuses, 
the Canadian 1991 and 2001 censuses, the French 1999 census, the Australian 1991 and 2001 
censuses, the New-Zealand 1991 and 2001 censuses, the Danish 2000 register, the Greek 
2001 census and the Belgian 1991 census. Together, the countries sampled represent 77 
percent of total skilled immigration to the OECD area. The sample is representative of the 
OECD in that it includes countries with different demographic sizes, regional locations, 
development levels and immigration policy and tradition. 
We thus have bilateral information on immigrants' origin, age, education level and age of 
entry from 12 host countries' censuses for 192 sending countries. These 2304 observations 
allow us to compute the proportion of immigrants arrived before ages 12, 18 and 22 in the 
total stocks of immigrants aged 25+ estimated by Docquier and Marfouk (2006). Eliminating 
zeros and a few suspicious observations, we end up with 1580 observations for each age 
threshold. 
Table 3 gives descriptive statistics on the estimated proportions of adult immigrants who 
arrived before age J (J = 12, 18 and 22). The average shares vary across receiving countries 
(not shown). On the whole, the average shares are 85.7%, 78.2% and 69.1% for immigrants 
arrived before age 12, 18 or 22. They are usually higher for Belgium, Denmark and Greece. 
The lowest shares are observed in Australia, New Zealand and the United States. Canada and 
France are not far from the average distribution. 
Obviously, an approach based on Census data is not perfect. As explained by Rosenzweig 
(2005, p. 9), “information on entry year ... is based on answers to an ambiguous question - in 
the US Census the question is “When did you first come to stay?” ” Immigrants might answer 
this question by providing the date when they received a permanent immigrant visa, not the 
date when they first came to the US, at which time they might not have intended to or been 
able to stay. Only surveys based on a comprehensive migration history would provide precise 
data about the location in which schooling was acquired.  
  21However, the Census is the only representative source of data available in many countries. In 
addition, extrapolating the entry age structure from surveys (such as NIS – 4\% of immigrants 
- or NSIP - a sample of 150,000 persons out of more than 25,000,000 adult immigrants - for 
the US) can be misleading. The number of observations can be very small for countries with 
few emigrants; this is typically the case of small countries which, on the other hand, are 
precisely the ones most affected by the brain drain in relative terms. 
 
4.2. Results for small states 
Table 3 presents the results for the brain drain from small states for all those who migrated, 
irrespective of their age (as in Table 2), for those who migrated before age 12, 18 and 22, and 
also the ratio of the latter to all those who migrated (22+/0+). Focusing on that ratio, we see 
for 2000 that it is equal to 70.1% for small states as a whole, with little variation across the 
three population groups (Groups 1 to 3), and about the same as that for developing as a whole. 
It is about 8% smaller for high-income countries and 2% smaller for the world average.  
The ratio declined from 1990 to 2000 for small states as a whole (from 74.0 to 70.1%) as well 
as for all small states groups (with the major decline for the largest group and for East Asia 
and Pacific), implying that a larger share of migrants obtained their degrees at home. On the 
other hand, the ratio increased for all other country groups.   
Table 4 shows the brain drain by small state for the various age-of-entry groups. The 
correlation between the first group (BD 0+) and the last group (BD 22+), with identical 
ranking of the top six countries (Guyana, Grenada, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and Samoa), with 9 of the top 10 countries for 
BD 22+ also in the top 10 for BD 0+, and with the same top 20 countries in both groups.  
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Table 3. Adjusted brain drain by country group (1990 and 2000) 
 
                     2000 1990























22+ / 0+ 
Small States (pop < 1.5 million)  46                      43.2% 39.4% 35.4% 30.2% 70.1% 50.0% 46.3% 42.3% 37.0% 74.0%
           by population size              
Population from 0 to 0.5 million  32                      41.7% 38.0% 34.0% 29.1% 69.8% 46.0% 42.5% 38.8% 33.9% 73.8%
Population from 0.5 to 1 million  8                      47.2% 43.0% 38.6% 32.8% 69.4% 45.8% 42.0% 38.0% 32.5% 70.9%
Population from 1 to 1.5 million  6                      40.9% 37.6% 34.0% 29.3% 71.6% 68.9% 65.6% 61.8% 56.4% 81.8%
          by region / income              
East Asia and Pacific  12                      50.9% 45.1% 39.9% 34.5% 67.8% 74.2% 69.6% 64.5% 60.0% 80.8%
Latin America and Caribbean  10                      74.9% 72.2% 68.2% 62.4% 83.3% 75.4% 73.0% 69.5% 63.9% 84.8%
Sub-Saharan Africa  10                      41.7% 38.0% 35.6% 32.1% 76.8% 43.3% 39.2% 36.8% 34.1% 78.6%
High-income countries  12                      23.0% 19.9% 17.9% 14.9% 64.6% 24.9% 21.9% 20.1% 17.0% 68.5%
 
Other Groups of Interest 
            
Small Islands Developing States  37                      42.4% 38.0% 33.1% 28.3% 66.6% 45.0% 40.4% 35.5% 30.8% 68.4%
Population from 1.5 to 3 million  15                      20.9% 18.4% 15.6% 13.2% 63.4% 25.0% 21.9% 18.2% 15.2% 61.0%
Population from 3 to 4 million  13                     
                   
18.5% 16.7% 15.6% 13.8% 74.7% 20.7% 18.5% 17.3% 15.3% 73.8%
World average  192 5.3% 4.6% 4.1% 3.6% 68.6% 5.2% 4.4% 4.0% 3.5% 66.9%
Total high-income countries  41                      3.5% 2.9% 2.6% 2.3% 64.7% 3.8% 3.1% 2.8% 2.4% 64.1%
Total developing countries  151 7.4%                    6.6% 5.9% 5.2% 71.1% 7.8% 6.9% 6.2% 5.4% 69.8%
Source: Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2006) 
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 Country  BD 0+  BD 12+  BD 18+  BD 22+   Population 
Tuvalu 27.3%  26.1%  25.5%  23.8%  11468 
Nauru 34.5%  28.0%  23.4%  19.8%  12809 
Palau 26.1%  24.1%  22.3%  18.5%  20016 
San Marino  17.1%  16.4%  15.9%  14.9%  28503 
Saint Kitts and Nevis  78.5%  76.3%  72.0%  65.3%  38836 
Marshall Islands  39.4%  39.4%  39.3%  39.2%  57738 
Antigua and Barbuda  66.8%  63.4%  57.8%  49.6%  68320 
Dominica 64.2%  61.2%  57.4%  51.2%  69278 
Andorra 6.9%  5.8%  5.4%  4.6%  69865 
Seychelles 55.8%  53.3%  51.0%  47.5%  80832 
Grenada 85.1%  83.7%  81.2%  76.9%  89357 
Kiribati 23.1%  22.0%  21.2%  20.7%  100798 
Tonga 75.2%  70.4%  65.1%  58.8%  101000 
Micronesia, Federated States  37.8% 37.4% 36.9% 34.8%  107000 
Saint Vincent & Grenadines  84.5% 83.0% 79.8% 75.1%  119000 
Saint Lucia  71.1%  68.2% 64.8% 59.2%  147000 
Sao Tome and Principe  22.0%  21.5%  21.2%  20.0%  149000 
Samoa 76.4%  71.7%  66.4% 60.9%  174000 
Vanuatu 8.2%  6.7%  5.8%  4.7%  195000 
Belize 65.5%  61.5%  54.8% 47.0%  238000 
Barbados 63.5%  59.7%  53.8%  47.5%  266000 
Iceland 19.6%  18.3%  17.4% 15.8%  282000 
Maldives 1.2%  1.0%  0.9%  0.8%  290000 
Bahamas 61.3%  53.7%  47.7%  42.3%  300000 
Brunei 15.6%  13.3%  11.5%  9.7%  335000 
Malta 57.6%  53.3%  49.7%  44.1%  389000 
Suriname 47.9%  44.6%  42.6%  36.7%  425000 
Luxembourg 8.0%  7.1%  6.7%  5.8%  436000 
Solomon Islands  6.4%  5.0%  4.1%  3.5%  437000 
Cape Verde  67.4%  62.9%  59.4%  55.5%  438000 
Macao 14.4%  13.3%  12.5% 11.4%  449000 
Equatorial Guinea  12.9%  12.0% 11.5% 10.2%  457000 
Qatar 2.5%  2.3%  2.1%  1.9%  582000 
Djibouti 11.0%  9.2%  8.3%  7.5%  666000 
Bahrain 4.9%  4.3%  3.9%  3.5%  677000 
East Timor  15.5%  11.7%  9.5%  7.9%  701000 
Comoros 21.9%  19.5%  17.3%  13.1%  706000 
Guyana 89.0%  87.7%  85.4%  81.9%  761000 
Cyprus 33.2%  28.6%  26.3%  21.3%  783000 
Fiji 62.2%  56.4%  50.9%  44.5%  813000 
Mauritius 56.1%  52.2%  49.4%  45.1%  1186000 
Gabon 14.7%  11.6%  10.0%  8.4%  1258000 
Trinidad and Tobago  79.3%  76.6%  73.0%  67.5%  1289000 
Gambia 63.2%  62.5%  62.1%  60.4%  1312000 
Estonia 11.5%  10.8%  10.3%  9.4%  1366000 




  245.  BILATERAL DATA 
Table 5 presents for the small states the number and share of skilled migrants by host region. 
None of the results are really surprising.  
¾  First, 66% or two thirds of skilled migrants from small states go to the US + Canada, 
followed by the EU15 with 23% and Australia + New Zealand (10%).     
¾  Second, the first destination in 2000 of East Asia and Pacific skilled migrants was 
Australia + New Zealand (56%) followed by USA + Canada (41%), that of Latin 
America and Caribbean was USA + Canada (84%) and the EU15 (16%), that of Sub-
Saharan Africa is the EU15 (57%), followed by USA + Canada (27%) and Australia + 
New Zealand (15%), and that of high-income countries is 43% for both the EU15 and 
USA + Canada, and 12% for Australia + New Zealand. Thus, the region whose skilled 
migration is the most concentrated across the host regions is Latin America and the 
Caribbean, followed by Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia and the Pacific, and by high-
income countries.     
¾  Third, as for evolution, the distribution across host regions has been fairly stable, with 
minimal changes in their shares of skilled immigrants from the various source regions 
between 1990 and 2000. This may attest to the strength of existing migrant networks 
in determining new migrants’ destination. In other words, history matters – whether 
the network was formed because of small distance, large income differentials, past 
colonial ties, or other. 
  25Table 5.  Small states brain drain by destination 
 
 Skilled emigrants in 2000 
  To:   
DESTINATION 
SOURCE 
OCDE USA  + 
Canada 
EU15 Australia  + 
N. Zealand 
Others 
East Asia and Pacific  76307  31234  1916  43053  104 
   41% 3% 56% 0% 
Latin America and Caribbean  375822  315227  58780  1448  366 
   84% 16%  0%  0% 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  44493 12206 25269  6554  464 
   27% 57% 15%  1% 
High-income  countries  113555  49201 48641 13837  1876 
   43% 43% 12%  2% 
Total  634100 417289 147626  66107  3079 
  66% 23% 10%  0% 
      
 Skilled emigrants arrived after age 22 in 2000 
  To:   
DESTINATION 
SOURCE 
OCDE USA  + 
Canada 
EU15 Australia  + 
N. Zealand 
Others 
East Asia and Pacific  38851  17152  1391  20210  77 
   44% 4% 52% 0% 
Latin America and Caribbean  208565  171624  35910  712  208 
   82% 17%  0%  0% 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  29313 8412 17423 3096  170 
   29% 59% 11%  1% 
High-income  countries  66301 28013 29038  7896  925 
   42% 44% 12%  1% 
Total 362082  232161  94476  33073  1532 
  64% 26%  9%  0% 
      
 Skilled emigrants in 1990 
  To:   
DESTINATION 
SOURCE 
OCDE USA  + 
Canada 
EU15 Australia  + 
N. Zealand 
Others 
East Asia and Pacific  48797  15718  736  32329  41 
   32% 2% 66% 0% 
Latin America and Caribbean  217056  178872  36608  1200  275 
   82% 17%  1%  0% 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  26587 6763 11173 8393  86 
   25% 42% 32%  0% 
High-income  countries  81315 33642 32198 14472  452 
   41% 40% 18%  1% 
Total 373885  234995  80748  56488  803 
  63% 22% 15%  0% 
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6.  CONCLUSION 
This paper presented evidence on the brain drain, focusing on small states. We found that  
small states i) had three out of seven skilled individuals (43%) living outside their country of 
origin in 2000; ii) had a brain drain level that amounts to over 5 times the brain drain in 
developing countries as a whole, 12 times that in high-income countries as a whole, and 8 
times that of the world, iii) that it declined between 1990 and 2000, iv) that their schooling 
gap was much smaller than that for developing countries as a whole and similar to that for the 
world as a whole and, and v) that it declined for all small state groups and other country 
groups, except for small high-income states and for high-income countries as a whole.  
When correcting for the age of entry, we found that in small states in 2000, skilled emigrants 
arriving in the host country after the age of 22 (and who presumably obtained their university 
education in their country of origin) amounted to about 70% of all skilled migrants (including 
those who obtained their university education abroad). This ratio was similar for all 
developing countries as well as for the world average, and it declined between 1990 and 2000 
in all small states groups while increasing in all other country groups.     
We also found that the distribution of migrants across host regions has been fairly stable, with 
minimal changes in their shares of skilled immigrants from the various source regions 
between 1990 and 2000. We hypothesized that this reflected the strength of existing migrant 
networks in determining new migrants’ destination, with past migration patterns strongly 
affecting subsequent migration decisions. This is because the networks themselves have a 
strong impact and because a number of variables found to affect the incentive to migrate to a 
certain region – compared to other regions or staying home — are invariant with respect to 
time, including distance and colonial past, while another variable, namely income differential, 
did not change significantly over the period.   
The negative trend in the brain drain is unlikely to be sufficient to stop the hemorrhage in the 
poorer small states anytime in the near or foreseeable future, and implementing some policies 
to slow it down might be in order. However, few policies that would succeed in reducing the 
brain drain seems have been found, and some might even be counterproductive.
24 A strategy 
                                                           
24 For instance, some African countries have given degrees in certain fields that are not recognized 
internationally in order to retain more professionals in the country. However, this policy is likely to have a 
smaller effect than, if not opposite to, the intended one. The reason is that the policy is likely to reduce the total 
  27from which source countries would benefit is by establishing programs, in cooperation with 
host countries, to provide fellowships to study abroad, on the condition that the recipients 
return home after graduation for a specified period of time before having the option to 
emigrate again.
25 Countries lacking the resources to do so would have to obtain financing 
from foreign sources (e.g., the host countries involved). Some students might decide not to 
return and the program’s success would depend on agreements between source and host 
countries to prevent such occurrences, such as the host country committing not to renew the 
visa of those refusing to return after completing their studies or internship. 
Another strategy that should help convince some graduates to remain home, and some 
migrants and students abroad to return home would be to improve conditions for skilled labor 
in the public sector. This would also improve public services by raising the quality of the staff 
and reducing the extent of absenteeism. Such a policy could be conducted together with the 
previous one and might also require external support. 
Finally, source countries would benefit if skilled migrants’ hiring contracts abroad could be 
made temporary, possibly stipulating that these migrants would be able to return after a 
specified period of time in their home country.     
                                                                                                                                                                                     
number of students in those fields, and to raise the number of those who study and remain abroad because they 
tend to be more successful in the host countries than those who migrate after completing their study at home.   
25 Such circular migration would also benefit host countries because it would reduce the extent to which migrants 
reneged on their commitment to leave after graduation (Schiff 2007).     
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